Dropping suid bits is not enough to let us trust the caller; the unix_chkpwd
helper could be sgid shadow instead of suid root, as it is in Debian and
Ubuntu by default.  Drop any sgid bits as well.

Authors: Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>,
         Michael Spang <mspang@csclub.uwaterloo.ca>

Upstream status: to be submitted

Index: pam-debian/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
===================================================================
--- pam-debian.orig/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c	2011-10-10 16:22:06.270705822 -0700
+++ pam-debian/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c	2011-10-10 16:24:06.080224301 -0700
@@ -137,9 +137,10 @@
 	  /* if the caller specifies the username, verify that user
 	     matches it */
 	  if (strcmp(user, argv[1])) {
+	    gid_t gid = getgid();
 	    user = argv[1];
 	    /* no match -> permanently change to the real user and proceed */
-	    if (setuid(getuid()) != 0)
+	    if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) != 0 || setuid(getuid()) != 0)
 		return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
 	  }
 	}
