
From: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>

I'd need it merged into mainline at some point, unless anybody has strong
arguments against it.  All I can guarantee here, is that I'll back it out
myself in the future, iff Cpushare will fail and nobody else started using
it in the meantime for similar security purposes.

(akpm: project details are at http://www.cpushare.com/technical.  It seems
like a good idea to me, and one which is worth supporting.  I agree that for
this to be successful, the added robustness of Andrea's simple and specific
jail is worthwhile).

Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
---

 25-akpm/arch/i386/Kconfig                |   17 +++++++
 25-akpm/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S         |    6 +-
 25-akpm/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c        |    4 +
 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/Kconfig              |   18 +++++++
 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S     |    6 +-
 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S       |    2 
 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c      |    4 +
 25-akpm/fs/proc/base.c                   |   74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 25-akpm/include/asm-i386/thread_info.h   |    7 ++
 25-akpm/include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h |    6 +-
 25-akpm/include/linux/sched.h            |    2 
 25-akpm/include/linux/seccomp.h          |   33 +++++++++++++
 25-akpm/kernel/Makefile                  |    1 
 25-akpm/kernel/seccomp.c                 |   74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 14 files changed, 244 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff -puN arch/i386/Kconfig~seccomp arch/i386/Kconfig
--- 25/arch/i386/Kconfig~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/i386/Kconfig	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -896,6 +896,23 @@ config REGPARM
 	generate incorrect output with certain kernel constructs when
 	-mregparm=3 is used.
 
+config SECCOMP
+	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+	depends on PROC_FS
+	default y
+	help
+	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+	  enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
+	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+	  defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+
 endmenu
 
 
diff -puN arch/i386/kernel/entry.S~seccomp arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
--- 25/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -219,7 +219,8 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
 	SAVE_ALL
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
 
-	testb $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),TI_flags(%ebp)
+	/* Note, _TIF_SECCOMP is bit number 8, and so it needs testw and not testb */
+	testw $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SECCOMP),TI_flags(%ebp)
 	jnz syscall_trace_entry
 	cmpl $(nr_syscalls), %eax
 	jae syscall_badsys
@@ -243,7 +244,8 @@ ENTRY(system_call)
 	SAVE_ALL
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
 					# system call tracing in operation
-	testb $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),TI_flags(%ebp)
+	/* Note, _TIF_SECCOMP is bit number 8, and so it needs testw and not testb */
+	testw $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SECCOMP),TI_flags(%ebp)
 	jnz syscall_trace_entry
 	cmpl $(nr_syscalls), %eax
 	jae syscall_badsys
diff -puN arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c~seccomp arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
--- 25/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/user.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -678,6 +679,9 @@ void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *ts
 __attribute__((regparm(3)))
 void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
 {
+	/* do the secure computing check first */
+	secure_computing(regs->orig_eax);
+
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
 		if (!entryexit)
 			audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->orig_eax,
diff -puN arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S~seccomp arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S
--- 25/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ ENTRY(ia32_sysenter_target)
  	.quad 1b,ia32_badarg
  	.previous	
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%r10)
-	testl  $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),threadinfo_flags(%r10)
+	testl  $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SECCOMP),threadinfo_flags(%r10)
 	jnz  sysenter_tracesys
 sysenter_do_call:	
 	cmpl	$(IA32_NR_syscalls),%eax
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ ENTRY(ia32_cstar_target)
 	.quad 1b,ia32_badarg
 	.previous	
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%r10)
-	testl $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),threadinfo_flags(%r10)
+	testl $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SECCOMP),threadinfo_flags(%r10)
 	jnz   cstar_tracesys
 cstar_do_call:	
 	cmpl $IA32_NR_syscalls,%eax
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ ENTRY(ia32_syscall)
 	   this could be a problem. */
 	SAVE_ARGS 0,0,1
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%r10)
-	testl $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),threadinfo_flags(%r10)
+	testl $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SECCOMP),threadinfo_flags(%r10)
 	jnz ia32_tracesys
 ia32_do_syscall:	
 	cmpl $(IA32_NR_syscalls),%eax
diff -puN arch/x86_64/Kconfig~seccomp arch/x86_64/Kconfig
--- 25/arch/x86_64/Kconfig~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/Kconfig	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -350,6 +350,24 @@ config X86_MCE_INTEL
 	help
 	   Additional support for intel specific MCE features such as
 	   the thermal monitor.
+
+config SECCOMP
+	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
+	depends on PROC_FS
+	default y
+	help
+	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
+	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
+	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
+	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
+	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
+	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
+	  enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
+	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
+	  defined by each seccomp mode.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
+
 endmenu
 
 #
diff -puN arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S~seccomp arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S
--- 25/arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ ENTRY(system_call)
 	movq  %rax,ORIG_RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) 
 	movq  %rcx,RIP-ARGOFFSET(%rsp)  
 	GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx)
-	testl $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT),threadinfo_flags(%rcx)
+	testl $(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SECCOMP),threadinfo_flags(%rcx)
 	jnz tracesys
 	cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax
 	ja badsys
diff -puN arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c~seccomp arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
--- 25/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/user.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -521,6 +522,9 @@ static void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs
 
 asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	/* do the secure computing check first */
+	secure_computing(regs->orig_rax);
+
 	if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
 		audit_syscall_entry(current, regs->orig_rax,
 				    regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
diff -puN fs/proc/base.c~seccomp fs/proc/base.c
--- 25/fs/proc/base.c~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/fs/proc/base.c	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /*
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ enum pid_directory_inos {
 	PROC_TGID_TASK,
 	PROC_TGID_STATUS,
 	PROC_TGID_MEM,
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	PROC_TGID_SECCOMP,
+#endif
 	PROC_TGID_CWD,
 	PROC_TGID_ROOT,
 	PROC_TGID_EXE,
@@ -80,6 +84,9 @@ enum pid_directory_inos {
 	PROC_TID_INO,
 	PROC_TID_STATUS,
 	PROC_TID_MEM,
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	PROC_TID_SECCOMP,
+#endif
 	PROC_TID_CWD,
 	PROC_TID_ROOT,
 	PROC_TID_EXE,
@@ -130,6 +137,9 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[
 	E(PROC_TGID_STATM,     "statm",   S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_MAPS,      "maps",    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_MEM,       "mem",     S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	E(PROC_TGID_SECCOMP,   "seccomp", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
+#endif
 	E(PROC_TGID_CWD,       "cwd",     S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_ROOT,      "root",    S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
 	E(PROC_TGID_EXE,       "exe",     S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
@@ -160,6 +170,9 @@ static struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[]
 	E(PROC_TID_STATM,      "statm",   S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_MAPS,       "maps",    S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_MEM,        "mem",     S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	E(PROC_TID_SECCOMP,    "seccomp", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
+#endif
 	E(PROC_TID_CWD,        "cwd",     S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_ROOT,       "root",    S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
 	E(PROC_TID_EXE,        "exe",     S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
@@ -808,6 +821,61 @@ static struct file_operations proc_login
 };
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+static ssize_t seccomp_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk = proc_task(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+	char __buf[20];
+	loff_t __ppos = *ppos;
+	size_t len;
+
+	/* no need to print the trailing zero, so use only len */
+	len = sprintf(__buf, "%u\n", tsk->seccomp.mode);
+	if (__ppos >= len)
+		return 0;
+	if (count > len - __ppos)
+		count = len - __ppos;
+	if (copy_to_user(buf, __buf + __ppos, count))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	*ppos = __ppos + count;
+	return count;
+}
+
+static ssize_t seccomp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk = proc_task(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+	char __buf[20], *end;
+	unsigned int seccomp_mode;
+
+	/* can set it only once to be even more secure */
+	if (unlikely(tsk->seccomp.mode))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	memset(__buf, 0, sizeof(__buf));
+	count = min(count, sizeof(__buf) - 1);
+	if (copy_from_user(__buf, buf, count))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	seccomp_mode = simple_strtoul(__buf, &end, 0);
+	if (*end == '\n')
+		end++;
+	if (seccomp_mode && seccomp_mode <= NR_SECCOMP_MODES) {
+		tsk->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+		set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SECCOMP);
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (unlikely(!(end - __buf)))
+		return -EIO;
+	return end - __buf;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations proc_seccomp_operations = {
+	.read		= seccomp_read,
+	.write		= seccomp_write,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
+
 static int proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1443,6 +1511,12 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup
 			inode->i_op = &proc_mem_inode_operations;
 			inode->i_fop = &proc_mem_operations;
 			break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+		case PROC_TID_SECCOMP:
+		case PROC_TGID_SECCOMP:
+			inode->i_fop = &proc_seccomp_operations;
+			break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
 		case PROC_TID_MOUNTS:
 		case PROC_TGID_MOUNTS:
 			inode->i_fop = &proc_mounts_operations;
diff -puN include/asm-i386/thread_info.h~seccomp include/asm-i386/thread_info.h
--- 25/include/asm-i386/thread_info.h~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/include/asm-i386/thread_info.h	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ register unsigned long current_stack_poi
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* restore singlestep on return to user mode */
 #define TIF_IRET		5	/* return with iret */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
+#define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	16	/* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
 #define TIF_MEMDIE		17
 
@@ -150,12 +151,14 @@ register unsigned long current_stack_poi
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1<<TIF_SINGLESTEP)
 #define _TIF_IRET		(1<<TIF_IRET)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
+#define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1<<TIF_SECCOMP)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 
 /* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK \
-  (0x0000FFFF & ~(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SINGLESTEP))
-#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK	0x0000FFFF	/* work to do on any return to u-space */
+  (0x0000FFFF & ~(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SINGLESTEP|_TIF_SECCOMP))
+/* work to do on any return to u-space */
+#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK	(0x0000FFFF & ~_TIF_SECCOMP)
 
 /*
  * Thread-synchronous status.
diff -puN include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h~seccomp include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h
--- 25/include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *stack_
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
 #define TIF_IRET		5	/* force IRET */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
+#define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
 #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	16	/* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
 #define TIF_IA32		17	/* 32bit process */ 
 #define TIF_FORK		18	/* ret_from_fork */
@@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *stack_
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_IRET		(1<<TIF_IRET)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
+#define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1<<TIF_SECCOMP)
 #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG	(1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
 #define _TIF_IA32		(1<<TIF_IA32)
 #define _TIF_FORK		(1<<TIF_FORK)
@@ -122,9 +124,9 @@ static inline struct thread_info *stack_
 
 /* work to do on interrupt/exception return */
 #define _TIF_WORK_MASK \
-  (0x0000FFFF & ~(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SINGLESTEP))
+  (0x0000FFFF & ~(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_SINGLESTEP|_TIF_SECCOMP))
 /* work to do on any return to user space */
-#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK 0x0000FFFF	
+#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK (0x0000FFFF & ~_TIF_SECCOMP)
 
 #define PREEMPT_ACTIVE     0x10000000
 
diff -puN include/linux/sched.h~seccomp include/linux/sched.h
--- 25/include/linux/sched.h~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/include/linux/sched.h	2005-03-07 21:14:16.000000000 -0800
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/topology.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
 
 struct exec_domain;
 
@@ -643,6 +644,7 @@ struct task_struct {
 	
 	void *security;
 	struct audit_context *audit_context;
+	seccomp_t seccomp;
 
 /* Thread group tracking */
    	u32 parent_exec_id;
diff -puN /dev/null include/linux/seccomp.h
--- /dev/null	2003-09-15 06:40:47.000000000 -0700
+++ 25-akpm/include/linux/seccomp.h	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+#define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+
+#define NR_SECCOMP_MODES 1
+
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+
+typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t;
+
+extern void __secure_computing(int);
+static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+{
+	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
+		__secure_computing(this_syscall);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
+
+#if (__GNUC__ > 2)
+  typedef struct { } seccomp_t;
+#else
+  typedef struct { int gcc_is_buggy; } seccomp_t;
+#endif
+
+#define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
diff -puN kernel/Makefile~seccomp kernel/Makefile
--- 25/kernel/Makefile~seccomp	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
+++ 25-akpm/kernel/Makefile	2005-03-07 21:14:16.000000000 -0800
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSFS) += ksysfs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS) += irq/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) += seccomp.o
 
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_IA64),y)
 # According to Alan Modra <alan@linuxcare.com.au>, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer is
diff -puN /dev/null kernel/seccomp.c
--- /dev/null	2003-09-15 06:40:47.000000000 -0700
+++ 25-akpm/kernel/seccomp.c	2005-03-07 20:41:40.000000000 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
+ *
+ * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
+ *
+ * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing mode.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#ifdef TIF_IA32
+#include <asm/ia32_unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+/* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
+
+/*
+ * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
+ * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
+ * to limit the stack allocations too.
+ */
+static int mode1_syscalls[] = {
+	__NR_read, __NR_write, __NR_exit,
+	/*
+	 * Allow either sigreturn or rt_sigreturn, newer archs
+	 * like x86-64 only defines __NR_rt_sigreturn.
+	 */
+#ifdef __NR_sigreturn
+	__NR_sigreturn,
+#else
+	__NR_rt_sigreturn,
+#endif
+	0, /* null terminated */
+};
+
+#ifdef TIF_IA32
+static int mode1_syscalls_32bit[] = {
+	__NR_ia32_read, __NR_ia32_write, __NR_ia32_exit,
+	/*
+	 * Allow either sigreturn or rt_sigreturn, newer archs
+	 * like x86-64 only defines __NR_rt_sigreturn.
+	 */
+	__NR_ia32_sigreturn,
+	0, /* null terminated */
+};
+#endif
+
+void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+{
+	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+	int * syscall;
+
+	switch (mode) {
+	case 1:
+		syscall = mode1_syscalls;
+#ifdef TIF_IA32
+		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32))
+			syscall = mode1_syscalls_32bit;
+#endif
+		do {
+			if (*syscall == this_syscall)
+				return;
+		} while (*++syscall);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
+	dump_stack();
+#endif
+	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+}
_
